A New Approach to Statutory Interpretation in
Washington
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When the legislature enacts a statute, it intends to accomplish a
particular purpose. Such a purpose may be shrouded in imprecise
drafting, legislative jargon, or political compromise.' Nevertheless, it
is the constitutional role of the courts in a particular case to implement
the legislative purpose expressed in statute. It is in this practical application that the problems with the enactment arise.
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1. Used in this context, I mean political compromise over the purpose or sections of the
enactment. Some commentators, none of whom have been legislators, imply that legislative bodies intentionally make statutory language vague to achieve a political compromise. See, e.g.,
Kenneth Shepsle, Congress Is a "They," Not an "It": Legislative Intent as Oxymoron, 12 INT'L
REV. L. & ECON. 239, 240-41 (1992); see also Reed Dickerson, Statutory Interpretation:Dipping
into Legislative History, 11 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1125, 1142 (1983). The view was cited with approval by the Washington State Supreme Court with regard to the Growth Management Act in
Association of Rural Residents v. Kitsap County, 141 Wash. 2d 185, 188-89, 4 P.3d 115, 117
(2000):
The GMA was a legislative compromise, and how it is carried out and enforced is a
reflection of this compromise. As one commentator has stated: "unlike [the State Environmental Policy Act of 1971 (SEPA), WASH. REV. CODE § 43.21C (2000),] and
[the Shoreline Management Act of 1971, WASH. REV. CODE § 90.58 (2000)], GMA
was spawned by controversy, not consensus. The relative spheres of state mandate
and local autonomy were the product of extremely difficult legislative compromise."
Richard L. Settle, Washington's Growth Management Revolution Goes to Court, 23
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 5, 34 (1999). Moreover, [b]ecause the recommendations of the
Growth Strategies Commission were variously embraced, rejected, and ignored by the
wrangling legislature, the GMA was not the finely-honed product of a law revision
commission. Both installments of the Act were riddled with politically necessary
omissions, internal inconsistencies, and vague language, sometimes consciously designed to defer the final reckoning to another day and, perhaps, another forum.
Ass'n of Rural Residents, 141 Wash. 2d at 188-89, 4 P.3d at 117.
In my sixteen years in the Washington Legislature, I can recall no instance where we
intentionally made the language of a statute ambiguous.
This would be politically
counterintuitive as both sides to such an agreement would legitimately fear the likely court
decision interpreting the statute.

Seattle University Law Review

[Vol. 25:179

In a case or controversy, the courts use a variety of principles of
statutory interpretation to assess precisely what the legislature meant
in enacting a statute. Unfortunately, the canons of statutory construction developed by courts across the United States, including those in
Washington, are often result-driven. There are literally so many canons of statutory construction, often diametrically opposed to one another, that the courts may pick and choose those canons most favorable to the ultimate disposition the court wishes to achieve. This
leaves considerable power in the hands of the judiciary to make policy
as the judges deem fit without regard to the legislature's actual intent
in enacting a statute.
In this article, I will first explore Washington's existing law, both
statutory and judicial, on statutory interpretation. I will then evaluate
the mechanisms for construing statutes derived from common law and
legislative sources. Finally, I will recommend a new paradigm for
statutory construction so that legislative intent may be more accurately
conveyed to the courts, abandoning many of the time-encrusted canons in favor of principles of interpretation adhering more specifically
to the legislature's actual statutory language.
I.

WASHINGTON LAW ON STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION

Washington law on statutory construction is found in statute,
court rule, and case law. However, the common law rules of construction have been the predominant analytical force for interpreting statutes. Each aspect of interpretation is treated here in turn.
A. Statutes
A little known aspect of Washington law on statutory construction is that the legislature itself has established certain rules of construction in statute. As early as 1891, the legislature determined that
the Washington Revised Code was to both be "liberally construed"
and "not be limited by any rule of strict construction. '"2 The courts
have not specifically employed this statutory provision, instead choosing generally to utilize common law rules of statutory construction,
applying statutes liberally or strictly.
Where statutes are amended, the legislature has adopted a general policy against implied repealers; statutory provisions substantially
the same as those of a statute existing when the provisions were enacted are deemed a continuation of that statute.3
2. WASH. REV. CODE§ 1.12.010 (2000).
3. WASH. REV. CODE § 1.12.020 (2000); State ex rel. Duvall v. City Council, 71 Wash. 2d
462, 429 P.2d 235 (1967) (amendatory statute deemed to continue former statutory proceedings
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If the legislature has amended the same code section more than
once in the same legislative session without internal reference, the
various amendments may be given effect if they do not conflict; if they
conflict, the last enacted amendment controls.4 The legislature delegated authority to the code reviser to publish the Washington Revised
Code section with all of the amendments incorporated into that section, as well as to decodify repealed code sections which were repealed
5
without reference to an amendment to the section.
References to time,6 certified mail use,7 and numbers and gender'
are also addressed by legislative rule.
In recognition of separation of powers concerns, 9 the legislature
adopted a statute indicating court rules in conflict with statutory provisions render the statutory enactments of "no further force or effect."' ° This statute has been found constitutional," but the courts
have limited its application to procedural statutes. 2 Wherever possible, however, the courts endeavor to harmonize conflicts between rules
and statutes to give effect to both within their appropriate spheres. 3
The legislative enactments on statutory construction, though not
extensive in scope, are significant because they confirm a critical prinwhere changes in amendatory act were procedural in nature); State v. Carroll, 81 Wash. 2d 95,
500 P.2d 115 (1972).
4. WASH. REV. CODE § 1.12.025(1) (2000); In re Henderson, 97 Wash. 2d 356, 644 P.2d
1178 (1982).
5. WASH. REV. CODE§ 1.12.025(2) (2000).
6. WASH. REV. CODE§ 1.12.040 (2000).
7. WASH. REV. CODE § 1.12.060 (2000) (registered mail and certified mail are interchangeable).
8. WASH. REV. CODE§ 1.12.050 (2000).
9. Marine Power & Equip. Co., Inc. v. Indus. Indemnity Co., 102 Wash. 2d 457, 687 P.2d
202 (1984) (under separation of powers, court has authority to set court rules even if inconsistent
with rules set by the legislature); State v. Fields, 85 Wash. 2d 126, 530 P.2d 284 (1975); State v.
Smith, 84 Wash. 2d 498, 527 P.2d 674 (1974) (courts have inherent power to adopt rules of procedure).
10. WASH. REV. CODE§ 2.04.200 (2000).
11. State ex rel. Foster-Wyman Lumber Co. v. Superior Court, 148 Wash. 1, 267 P. 770
(1928) (legislature could delegate power to supreme court to promulgate rules and could invalidate inconsistent statutes); In re Messmer, 52 Wash. 2d 510, 326 P.2d 1004 (1958).
12. The Washington State Supreme Court differentiated procedural from substantive concerns as follows:
Although a clear line of demarcation cannot always be delineated between what is
substantive and what is procedural, the following general guidelines provide a useful
framework for analysis. Substantive law prescribes norms for societal conduct and
punishments for violations thereof. It thus creates, defines, and regulates primary
rights. In contrast, practice and procedure pertain to the essentially mechanical operations of the courts by which substantive law, rights, and remedies are effectuated.
Smith, 84 Wash. 2d at 501, 527 P.2d at 676-77; see also State v. Ryan, 103 Wash. 2d 165, 691
P.2d 197 (1984); Petrarca v. Halligan, 83 Wash. 2d 773, 522 P.2d 827 (1974).
13. Emright v. King County, 96 Wash. 2d 538, 637 P.2d 656 (1981).
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ciple: the legislature may take an active role in directing how the
courts are to interpret legislative enactments. By statute, the legislature may direct particularized expansive or restrictive interpretations
of its work, or generally mandate that certain information regarding
the enactment is authoritative. This is vital to the later discussion in
this article of a new approach to statutory interpretation.
B. Court Rules
A second significant source of rules on statutory construction is
found in court rules. In adopting procedural rules for Washington's
courts, the Washington State Supreme Court has established policies
for construction of statutes in a narrow band of circumstances.
By court rule, procedural statutes are superseded by the civil and
criminal rules for superior court.14 In certain specific instances, the
judiciary has preserved a statutory enactment on what is ostensibly a
procedural matter.'" Whether the courts have the power to invalidate
legislative enactments by judicial fiat is an open question in Washing16
ton constitutiona law.
C. Case Law
The final and most significant source of rules in Washington on
statutory construction is case law. The Washington judiciary claims
the exclusive power to authoritatively interpret the acts of the legislature.17 This claim rings a bit hollow in light of the legislature's power
to amend a statute after the judicial interpretation of the legislature's
act.'" Regardless of the exclusivity of the authority, the consequences
14. CR 81; CrR 1.1.
15. E.g., CR 13(c)(1) (statutes on capacity of infants to sue and be sued); CR 60(e)(4)
(WASH. REV. CODE §§ 4.72.010-090 preserved).
16. See generally Hugh Spitzer, Court Rulemaking in Washington, 6 U. PUGET SOUND L.
REV. 31 (1982) (advocating shared judicial-legislative role in making court procedural rules in
light of history of both branches in court rules).
17. See, e.g., State v. Wilson, 125 Wash. 2d 212, 216, 883 P.2d 320, 322 (1994) (court is
"ultimate authority" on meaning and purpose of statute); see also Bellevue Fire Fighters Local
1604 v. City of Bellevue, 100 Wash. 2d 748, 751 n.1, 675 P.2d 592, 594 (1984), cert. denied, 471
U.S. 1015 (1985) (citing Davis v. County of King, 77 Wash. 2d 930, 933-34, 468 P.2d 679, 681
(1970)) (courts are final authority on statutory construction); Multicare Med. Ctr. v. Dep't of
Soc. & Health Servs., 114 Wash. 2d 572, 582 n.15, 790 P.2d 124, 130 (1990)""; Short v. Clallam
County, 22 Wash. App. 825, 832, 593 P.2d 821, 825 (1979) (court is "final arbiter" of legislative
intent).
18. This power of the Legislature to amend a statute to alter the judicial interpretation is
discussed infra at III-A. A fascinating example of the interplay between the branches in this regard is found in cases involving the standard of care for medical malpractice. In Helling v. Carey,
83 Wash. 2d 514, 519 P.2d 981 (1974), the Washington State Supreme Court held ophthalmologists could be held to a standard of care with respect to glaucoma higher than that practiced in
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of the judicial interpretation are very significant: the judiciary's interpretation of the statute becomes a part of the enactment as if it had
been there since the legislature enacted the legislation. 9
The Washington courts have developed a paradigm for analyzing
a statute; the centerpiece of this paradigm is that the courts analyze a
statute to carry out the intent of the legislature. 21 If the statute is plain
and unambiguous, the courts enforce the statute as written.21 If the
statute is ambiguous, susceptible to two or more reasonable interpretations, the courts resort to an interpretive process to ascertain the legislature's meaning.22 Each aspect of the paradigm is reviewed here in
turn.
1. Legislative Intent
In numerous cases, Washington courts have indicated that their
purpose in analyzing a statute is the implementation of legislative in-

the relevant medical community. The legislature amended the law relating to malpractice to define the standard of care more restrictively. The Court reaffirmed Helling in Gates v. Jensen, 92
Wash. 2d 246, 595 P.2d 919 (1979), despite the Legislature's action and its specific reference in a
bill report to its intent to overrule Helling.
19. See, e.g., Ino Ino v. City of Bellevue, 132 Wash. 2d 103, 137, 937 P.2d 154, 173
(1997); State v. Regan, 97 Wash. 2d 47, 51-52, 640 P.2d 725, 727-28 (1982).
20. A fairly typical recitation of this paradigm is found in Whatcom County v. City of Bellingham, 128 Wash. 2d 537, 546, 909 P.2d 1303, 1308 (1996):
In interpreting a statute, we do not construe a statute that is unambiguous. Food
Servs. of Am. v. Royal Heights, Inc., 123 Wash. 2d 779, 784-85, 871 P.2d 590
(1994). If the statute is ambiguous, the courts must construe the statute so as to effectuate the legislative intent. In so doing, we avoid a literal reading if it would result in
unlikely, absurd or strained consequences. State v. Elgin, 118 Wash. 2d 551, 555, 825
P.2d 314 (1992). The purpose of an enactment should prevail over express but inept
wording. Id.; State ex rel. Royal v. Bd. of Yakima County Comm'rs, 123 Wash. 2d
451, 462, 869 P.2d 56 (1994). The court must give effect to legislative intent determined "within the context of the entire statute." Elgin, 118 Wash. 2d at 556; Royal,
123 Wash. 2d at 459. Statutes must be interpreted and construed so that all the language used is given effect, with no portion rendered meaningless or superfluous.
Stone v. Chelan County Sheriffs Dep't, 110 Wash. 2d 806, 810, 756 P.2d 735 (1988);
Tommy P. v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 97 Wash. 2d 385, 391, 645 P.2d 697 (1982).
The meaning of a particular word in a statute "is not gleaned from that word alone[]
because our purpose is to ascertain legislative intent of the statute as a whole." State
v. Krall, 125 Wash. 2d 146, 148, 881 P.2d 1040 (1994).
See also In re Detention of A.S., 138 Wash. 2d 898, 911, 982 P.2d 1156, 1163 (1999) (the "primary objective in interpreting a statute is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the Legislature" (citing State v. Keller, 98 Wash. 2d 725, 728, 657 P.2d 1384, 1386 (1983)) (quoting In re
Detention of LaBelle, 107 Wash. 2d 196, 728 P.2d 138 (1986)).'
21. Food Servs. of Am. v. Royal Heights, Inc., 123 Wash. 2d 779, 871 P.2d 590 (1994).
22. See Vashon Island Cmty. for Self-Gov't v. State Boundary Review Bd., 127 Wash. 2d
759, 903 P.2d 953 (1995).
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variously as the court's "pritent. 2 ' This purpose has been described
24 or "paramount duty., 21
mary goal"
But in practical application, Washington courts have taken two
distinct approaches to the intent of the legislature. On the one hand,
the courts have adopted a literalist approach: take the words as the legislature stated them. 26 The second approach evaluates the "spirit" or
"purpose" of the enactment and interprets the statute so as to avoid an
absurd result compelled by the actual legislative language.27 Neither
23. Knipe v. Austin, 13 Wash. 189, 193, 44 P. 25, 26 (1895) ("The legislative mind may or
may not have reasoned correctly on this proposition, but when we concede to it the right to enter
upon an investigation of this kind, the results of the investigation expressed in an enactment cannot be called in question by the court."). See also C.L. Featherstone v. Dessert, 173 Wash. 264,
268, 22 P.2d 1050, 1052 (1933) ("In the interpretation of a statute, the intent of the legislature is
the vital thing, and the primary object is to ascertain and give effect to that intent.").
24. Nat'l Elec. Contractors Ass'n v. Riveland, 138 Wash. 2d 9, 19, 978 P.2d 481, 485
(1999).

25. State v. Johnson, 119 Wash. 2d 167, 172, 829 P.2d 1082, 1084 (1992).
26. Shelton Hotel Co. v. Bates, 4 Wash. 2d 498, 508, 104 P.2d 478, 482 (1940) (quoting
BLACK ON INTERPRETATION OF LAWS 48, 49, 53 (2d ed. 1911):

Even if the court is fully persuaded that the legislature really meant and intended
something entirely different from what is actually enacted, and that the failure to convey the real meaning was due to inadvertence or mistake in the use of language, yet, if
the words chosen by the legislature are not obscure or ambiguous, but convey a precise and sensible meaning (excluding the case of obvious clerical errors or elliptical
forms of expression), then the court must taken the law as it finds it, and give it its literal interpretation, without being influenced by the probable legislative meaning lying
back of the words.
A "court cannot read into a statute that which it may believe the legislature has omitted, be it an
intentional or inadvertent omission." Auto. Drivers & Demonstrators Union Local 882 v. Dep't
of Ret. Sys., 92 Wash. 2d 415, 421, 598 P.2d 379, 382-83 (1979) (citations omitted). See also
Vita Food Prods., Inc. v. State, 91 Wash. 2d 132, 587 P.2d 535 (1978) (court may not add words
to statute even if it believes the legislature intended something else but failed to express it); Duke
v. Boyd, 133 Wash. 2d 80, 942 P.2d 351 (1997).
27. See State v. Elgin, 118 Wash. 2d 551, 555, 825 P.2d 314, 316 (1992); see also State ex
rel. Royal v. Bd. of Yakima County Comm'rs, 123 Wash. 2d 451, 462, 869 P.2d 56, 62 (1994);
Janovich v. Herron, 91 Wash. 2d 767, 592 P.2d 1096 (1979); State v. Daniel J. Evans Campaign
Comm'n, 86 Wash. 2d 503, 546 P.2d 75 (1976) (holding that the spirit, purpose of a statute
overcomes an inept effort by Legislature to state such a purpose in the statute).
A similar analysis has been advanced in federal cases:
"There is, of course, no more persuasive evidence of the purpose of a statute than the
words by which the legislature undertook to give expression to its wishes." Nevertheless, in rare cases, the literal application of a statute will produce a result demonstratively at odds with the intentions of its drafters, and those intentions must be controlling. We have reserved some "scope for adopting a restricted rather than a literal or
usual meaning of its words where acceptance of that meaning... would thwart the
obvious purpose of the statute."
Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 485 U.S. 564, 571 (1982) (quoting first United States v.
Am. Trucking Ass'ns, Inc., 310 U.S. 534, 543 (1940); quoting second Comm'r v. Brown, 380
U.S. 563, 571 (1965). See also United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 242 (1989)
("The plain meaning of legislation should be conclusive, except in the 'rare cases [in which) the
literal application of a statute will produce a result demonstrably at odds with the intentions of its
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approach is exclusive, as Washington courts have used both. If, on
the one hand, the courts say they lack the power to insert words into a
statute that the legislature did not enact, it is difficult to then reconcile
case law indicating the courts will supply language to avoid absurd results and to carry out the legislature's spirit instead of the strict letter
of the law. If Washington courts have been troubled by these divergent models of statutory interpretation, they have not articulated such
concern in a written opinion.
The difficulty inherent in the seemingly simple exercise of ascertaining the legislative body's "intent" is striking. Of course, it is very
difficult to discern precisely what 147 legislators and the governor or
535 members of Congress and the President had in mind, if anything,
with regard to a piece of legislation. Not all legislators are actively involved in the enactment of a bill; not all legislators necessarily know
the contents of a bill on which they voted.28
By its nature, the legislative process expects legislators will develop expertise in certain types of legislation. Legislators serve on
committees organized by subject matter and bills are directed to those
committees for the critical initial work, including public hearings.29
Particular legislators, by virtue of their key leadership positions as
committee chairs, will have a greater say in the creation of legislation,
as well as its content.3" While the language of a statute expresses the
collective judgment of the legislature, it is also true that this collective
judgment may be the actual product of a single legislator or small
group of legislators.
Many commentators contend that it is possible to discern legislative intent from a statute.31 They argue that groups are capable of
forming intent; in fact, collective intent is common. Examples of
where collective intent commonly occurs are within the military, an
orchestra, a sports team, and a large corporation.
Philosopher Gilbert Ryle addressed this question decades ago.
Ryle used the example of a person who, on visiting Oxford University
and being shown the various "colleges, libraries, playing fields, muse-

drafters.' In such cases, the intention of the drafters, rather than the strict language, controls.")
(quoting Griffin, 458 U.S. at 571).
28. In the 2000 legislative meeting, a "short" session, for example, 866 bills were introduced in the House of Representatives and 763 in the Senate. In the regular and special sessions,
262 became law. See SENATE JOURNAL, 56th Legis. Sess. 1314-58 (Wash. 2000); HOUSE
JOURNAL, 56th Legis. Sess. 2199-2270 (Wash. 2000).
29. See EDWARD D. SEEBERGER, SINE DIE: A GUIDE TO THE WASHINGTON STATE
LEGISLATIVE PROCESS 45-54 (1989).
30. Id. at 41, 47-54.
31. See supra note 30, infra note 32.
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urns, scientific departments and administrative offices,... then asks,
'But where is the University."'3 2 After discussing two other examples,
Ryle writes:
These illustrations of category-mistakes have a common feature,
which must be noticed. The mistakes were made by people who
do not know how to wield the concepts University, division, and
team-spirit. Their puzzles arose from [an] inability to use certain items in the English vocabulary.
The theoretically interesting category-mistakes are those
made by people who are perfectly competent to apply concepts,
at least in the situations with which they are familiar, but are
still liable in their abstract thinking to allocate those concepts to
logical types to which they do not belong.33
This same concept has been applied to legislative intent:
To refuse to ascribe a "purpose" to Congress in enacting statutory language simply because one cannot find three or four hundred legislators who have claimed it as a personal purpose[] is
rather like (to use Professor Ryle's old example) refusing'to believe in the existence of Oxford University because one can only
find colleges.34
Legislatures can and do form an intent, which may be objectively
discovered. To understand an individual's true intent, it would be
necessary to inspect the inner workings of the person's decisionmaking process, because individual intent is both objective and
subjective.
Individual intent is formed by internal values and
impulses as well as external dynamics. By contrast, a legislature's
intent is objective and external. "A legislature is an intrinsically
public body and wears its inner thoughts on its sleeve, so to speak."3 5
Analyzing credible documentation of the legislature's process
regarding a statute may enable a court to find legislative intent.
The fact that legislators have divergent degrees of input on legislation has lead commentators to conclude it is impossible to discern a
single intent from a collective body.36 In federal parlance, this analysis
has been described as the "Busy Congress Model."" Legislators are
32. GILBERT RYLE, THE CONCEPT OF MIND 16-17 (1949).
SINCLAIR, GUIDE TO STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 91-93 (2000).

See also MICHAEL

33. RYLE, supra note 32, at 16-17.
34. Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in InterpretingStatutes, 65 S.CAL. L.
REV. 845, 866 (1992).
35. SINCLAIR, supra note 32, at 92.
36. See Shepsle, supra note 1.
37. See, e.g., Bank One Chicago v. Midwest Bank & Trust Co., 516 U.S. 264, 276-77 (Stevens, J., concurring) ("Legislators, like other busy people, often depend on the judgment of
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busy people who lack personal knowledge about most of the bills on
which they vote. Just as a corporate board member must rely on colleagues for information and advice about the issues that he or she
votes on, so a legislator must rely on trusted colleagues when casting a
vote. It is a common and acceptable practice to vote based on the advice of others rather than personal knowledge about the contents of
bills. No large institution could function if its decision makers could
not rely on the advice of others. Voting based on advice rather than
personal knowledge is a common and perfectly appropriate way of
managing massive decision making responsibilities. That some legislators lack personal knowledge related to the contents of bills in no
way diminishes the potency of the statute's legislative intent.
In response to the views that intent may be discerned from a collective body, or that legislative intent is appropriately gleaned from the
working of a busy legislative institution, some commentators not only
contend that it is impossible to discover a single intent from a group as
diverse as a legislative body,3" but also argue that to rely on the institutional processes associated with a legislative body may be demeaning
to the democratic process. For example, Justice Antonin Scalia of the
United States Supreme Court criticizes the "Busy Congress Model" as
degrading the legislative process because it acknowledges that staff
and lobbyists create laws with their accompanying legislative history;
this diminishes the role of the people elected to make those judgments.
According to Scalia, "[t]he legislative power ... is nondelegable.
Congress can no more authorize one committee to 'fill in the details' of
a particular law in a binding fashion than it can authorize a committee
to enact minor laws."3 9 Scalia and others would go farther and distrusted colleagues when discharging their official responsibilities.... [S]ince most Members are
content to endorse the views of the responsible committees, the intent of those involved in the
drafting process is properly regarded as the intent of the entire Congress.").
From my own legislative experience, it is common practice for legislators to rely on the expertise of their colleagues serving on committees that prepared legislation. This is a significant,
but not conclusive, factor. Legislators will often amend or vote against bills emerging from
committees on which they did not serve.
38. Justice Scalia articulates this view in the following fashion:
[T]o tell the truth, the quest for "genuine" legislative intent is probably a wild-goose
chase anyway. In the vast majority of cases[,] I expect that Congress neither (1) intended a single result, nor (2) meant to confer discretion upon the agency, but rather
(3) didn't think about the matter at all. If I am correct in that, then any rule adopted
[by an administrative agency] represents merely a fictional, presumed intent....
Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretationsof Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 511,
517 (1989). See also Frank Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533, 547 (1983)
("Each member may or may not have a design. The body as a whole, however, has only outcomes.")
39. ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
LAW: AN ESSAY 35 (1997). See also Blanchard v. Bergerson, 489 U.S. 87, 98-99 (1989) (Scalia,

Seattle University Law Review

[Vol. 25:179

pense with the concept of legislative intent entirely, contending that
the statutory text is the only real manifestation of legislative intent.
This approach has been termed "textualism" and has powerful his40
torical antecedents.
The importance of textualism rests in its simplicity. Such an approach rests on the language of the legislation rather than arcane judicial rules of construction or unreliable legislative history materials.
The meaning is more accessible and comprehensible to officials and
citizens affected by the legislation. The textual approach also tends to
constrain judicial tendencies to engage in policymaking by construction.41
The debate on legislative intent has raged in federal circles, but
Washington cases reveal little attention to the issue. While numerous
Washington cases speak of legislative intent, they are devoid of serious
discussion of the definition of the concept; by the very absence of
definition to legislative intent, intent is what the courts say it is. This
is hardly a satisfying articulation of a key concept in statutory interJ.,

concurring). Scalia responds to the majority's reliance on district court cases, which were inserted into the Congressional Report:
[The majority's use of the cited cases] displays the level of unreality that our unrestrained use of legislative history has attained.... As anyone familiar with modernday drafting of congressional committee reports is well aware, the references to the
cases were inserted, at best by a committee staff member on his own initiative, and at
worst by a committee staff member at the suggestion of a lawyer-lobbyist; and the
purpose of those references was not primarily to inform the Members of Congress
what the bill meant... but rather to influence judicial construction. What a heady
feeling it must be for a young staffer[] to know that his or her citation of obscure district court cases can transform them into the law of the land, thereafter dutifully to be
observed by the Supreme Court itself.
40. This concept of greater reliance on the legislative text has been oft-repeated. "[I]t
seems axiomatic that the words of a statute-and not the legislators' intent as such must be the
crucial elements both in the statute's legal force and in its proper interpretation." LAURENCE H.
TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL CHOICES 30 (1985). Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes was particularly skeptical about excessive reliance on the process of the legislative institution. "We do not
inquire what the legislature meant; we ask only what the statute means." Oliver Wendell
Holmes, The Theory of Legal Interpretation, 12 HARV. L. REV. 417, 419 (1899). Putting the
same thought in more colloquial terms: "[lI]f my fellow citizens want to go to Hell[,] I will help
them.
It's my job."
OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, HOLMES-LASKI LETTERS; THE
CORRESPONDENCE OF MR. JUSTICE HOLMES AND HAROLD J. LASKI 249 (Mark DeWolfe
Howe ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1953).
[N]ew textualism maintains that 'legislative intent' is a dysfunctional fiction that
should be jettisoned. A corollary is that the use of legislative history in statutory interpretation is a waste of time at best and, at worst, an activity so manipulable that it
is much more like looking over a crowd and picking out your friends than it is an objective historical recreation of what legislators collectively were contemplating.
Philip Frickey, John Minor Wisdom Lecture: Wisdom on Weber, 74 TUL. L. REV. 1169, 1185
(2000).
41. See Eric S. Lasky, Perplexing Problems with Plain Meaning, 27 HOFSTRA L. REV. 891,
895 (1999).
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pretation. Apparently, Washington courts have not been troubled in
the least about a definition of legislative intent while the debate about
the concept rages elsewhere.
However, an operating definition of legislative intent is possible.
For the judiciary to speak in terms of legislative intent as a monolithic
concept may be erroneous, but not fatal to the effort to discern the
"intent" of the legislature. The intent of the legislature is the aim or
purpose of the enactment as objectively indicated in the language of
the statute; the intent may be revealed in the process of a bill's enactment by the legislature. Although the subjective statements of individual legislators may contribute to understanding the legislature's objective intent as expressed in the statute's language, the touchstone for
the judiciary's interpretive role must still be, first and foremost, the
language of the statute."
This concept of legislative intent derived from the language of
the statute may be flexible. If the legislature is seeking to remedy a
very specific problem, its intention may be easy to discover. By contrast, if the problem is of greater magnitude, the legislature may envision a variety of potential ways of achieving the larger legislative goal
and may afford the judiciary or the administrative agencies wider discretion in achieving the necessary goal.43
42. In effect, the courts must presume that the language of the statute controls. This concept has its analog in a judicial doctrine that eschews an examination by the courts into the procedures of the legislature in passing a bill. Under the enrolled bill doctrine, for example, the
Washington State Supreme Court has expressed great reluctance on constitutional separation of
powers grounds to go behind the face of a statute's enactment to examine the process by which
the legislature enacted the measure. See, e.g., Citizens Council Against Crime v. Bjork, 84
Wash. 2d 891, 897-98 n.1, 529 P.2d 1072, 1076 n.1 (1975); see also State ex rel. Reed v. Jones, 6
Wash. 452, 34 P. 201 (1893) (enrolled bill presented to Secretary of State is conclusive as to regularity of all proceedings constitutional enactment if bill is fair on its face); State ex rel. Dunbar v.
State Bd. of Equalization, 140 Wash. 433, 249 P. 996 (1926) (proper repassage of bill after veto);
Morrow v. Henneford, 182 Wash. 625, 47 P.2d 1016 (1935) (legislation passed after 60 days of
regular legislative session); State ex rel. Bugge v. Martin, 38 Wash. 2d 834, 232 P.2d 833 (1951)
(scope and object of amendment); Roehl v. PUD No. 1, 43 Wash. 2d 214, 261 P.2d 92 (1953)
(same); State ex rel. Washington Toll Bridge Auth. v. Yelle, 61 Wash. 2d 28, 377 P.2d 466
(1962) (inquiry of senators as to whether they were deceived by bill).
Similarly, Washington courts intrude only reluctantly upon the legislative decision to declare
that a statute's enactment constitutes an emergency and must take effect immediately without the
possibility of a referendum. See CLEAN v. State, 130 Wash. 2d 782, 807-813, 928 P.2d 1054,
1066-69 (1996); State ex rel. Humiston v. Meyers, 61 Wash. 2d 772, 776, 380 P.2d 735, 738
(1963).
The enrolled bill doctrine is a recognition that the legislature may control its own procedures
for the enactment of legislation. It should be no different for statutory interpretation.
43. See William Eskridge, Jr., The Circumstances of Politics and the Application of Statutes,
100 COLUM. L. REv. 558, 564-65 (2000). See also SINCLAIR, supra note 32, at 119-33 (Sinclair
describes these varying levels of judiciary discretion as "tight" or "loose coupling." If the language and history of a statute indicates a "tight coupling," it is a signal to the judiciary to exercise
virtually no discretion in its application of the statute. For example, a law setting the speed limit
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In any event, it is still appropriate to speak of the judiciary's obligation, based on separation of powers analysis, to effectuate the Legislature's intent in interpreting an enactment as the touchstone of
statutory construction.44
2. Ambiguous/Unambiguous Enactments
a. Plain Meaning Rule
Washington courts have long indicated that they will not construe a plain and unambiguous statute, that is, they will not resort to
canons of construction or legislative history to analyze the meaning of
a statute. This is often described as the plain meaning rule.4"
The concept of judicial reluctance to construe unambiguous legislative enactments runs deep in the Anglo-American legal tradition.
Some commentators contend the plain meaning rule may be traced to
nineteenth century England.4 6
Early English cases indicated the courts would attempt to understand the "mischief" Parliament was seeking to suppress and then
would construe the statute in the fashion most advantageous to the
suppression of the mischief.4 7 Later English cases employed both a
literal rule4" and a so-called golden rule49 in interpreting statutes. In

in school zones at twenty miles per hour would leave virtually no discretion in the statute's application. By contrast, a statute that calls for a speed limit that is "reasonable and prudent for the
conditions" would signal to the judiciary that it may more freely use its own discretion in the
statute's application.).
44. This is important if the courts are truly to give meaning to the oft-expressed principle
that courts do not consider the wisdom of an enactment in their interpretation of it. See, e.g.,
Young v. Estate of Snell, 134 Wash. 2d 267, 279-80, 287, 948 P.2d 1291, 1296-97 (1997) (courts
may not question the wisdom and necessity of a statute).
45. A "court will interpret words in the statute according to their usual or plain meaning as
understood by the general public." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 796 (abr. 6th ed. 1991). The
rule may trace back to biblical times: "[T]he concept calling for strict construction of statutes has
roots in the Old Testament: 'You shall not add to the word which I command you, nor take from
it. (Deut. 4:2)' In re Kolinsky, 100 B.R. 695, 704 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1989). Even the framers of
American government longed for a version of a plain meaning rule: "Laws are made for men of
ordinary understanding and should, therefore, be construed by the ordinary rules of common
sense. Their meaning is not to be sought for in metaphysical subtleties which may make anything mean everything or nothing at pleasure." Letter of June 12, 1823, S. PADOVER, THE
COMPLETE JEFFERSON 323 (1943).
46. See generally Lasky, supra note 41, at 894-896; Bradley C. Karkkainen, "PlainMeaning": Justice Scalia's Jurisprudenceof Strict Statutory Construction, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
401, 433 n.124 (1994).
47. Heydon's Case, 76 Eng. Rep. 637, 638 (1584). See Samuel Thorne, Equity of a Statute
and Heydon's Case, 31 U. ILL. L. REV. 202, 211 (1936).
48. "[Ilf the words of an Act are clear, you must follow them, even though they lead to a
manifest absurdity." Queen v. Judge of the City of London Court, 1 Q.B. 273, 290 (1892).
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the United States, the plain meaning rule was effectively adopted by
the United States Supreme Court as early as 1889," but was not
adopted by name until 1929. 1
The plain meaning rule has been applied by Washington courts
since territorial days, but the courts did not articulate the origin of the
rule. 2 In Board of Trade v. Hayden,53 Justice Dunbar, who was present at the constitutional convention, implied the plain meaning rule
was an essential public policy. 4 He contended the courts must give
statutes their full effect, even if the result is unjust, arbitrary, or inconvenient.5
In recent years, Washington courts routinely apply the plain
rule to avoid interpretation of clear and unambiguous statmeaning
56
utes.
b. Elements of Ambiguity
The flaw in the plain meaning rule is that the Washington decisional law offers little guidance as to what a plain meaning is. A careful reading of Washington State Supreme Court authority indicating a
statute is plain or unambiguous reveals precious little guidance as to
how the court arrived at such a belief. Even in the face of dissenting
views as to the plain and unambiguous meaning of the statute, the
court has held to its paradigm. 7 In truth, in the absence of any clear
49. "We must.., give to the words used by the legislature their plain and natural meaning, unless it is manifest from the general scope and intention of the statute that injustice and
absurdity would result." Mattison v. Hart, 139 Eng. Rep. 147, 159 (1854).
50. See Lake County v. Rollins, 130 U.S. 662, 670 (1889) (If the words of the statute convey a definite meaning that involves no absurdity, nor any contradiction of other parts of the
statute, then the statute's facial meaning must be accepted).
51. United States v. Missouri Pac. R.R. Co., 278 U.S. 269, 278 (1929) ("Where the language of an enactment is clear, and construction according to its terms does not lead to absurd or
impracticable consequences, the words employed are to be taken as the final expression of the
meaning intended.") See also Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917) (where the
statutory language is plain, and only one meaning is discernible, no interpretation is required and
construction canons need not be employed).
52. See, e.g., Wheeler v. Port Blakely Mill Co., 2 Wash. Terr. 71, 74, 3 P. 635, 636 (1881).
See also Bd. of Trade v. Hayden, 4 Wash. 263, 280, 30 P. 87, 91 (1892); Howlett v. Cheatum, 17
Wash. 626, 629-30, 50 P. 522, 523 (1897); State v. Rathbun, 22 Wash. 651, 653, 62 P. 85, 86
(1900).
53. 4 Wash. 263, 30 P. 87 (1892).
54. Id., 4 Wash. at 281, 30 P. at 91.
55. Id.
56. See, e.g., Davis v. Dep't of Licensing, 137 Wash. 2d 957, 964, 977 P.2d 554, 556
(1999). See also State v. Enstone, 137 Wash. 2d 675, 680, 974 P.2d 828, 830 (1999); State v.
Chapman, 140 Wash. 2d 436, 998 P.2d 282 (2000); Hendrickson v. State, 140 Wash. 2d 686, 2
P.3d 473 (2000).
57. See, e.g., Davis, 137 Wash. 2d at 977-79, 977 P.2d at 563-64 (Alexander, J., dissenting).
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articulation of what distinguishes a plain and unambiguous enactment
from a murky, ambiguous statute, 58 it is clear that the court has imposed a value judgment in choosing a particular interpretation of a
statute. Indeed, perhaps the legislative history or interpretative canons would reveal the statute is neither plain nor ambiguous. 9
Perhaps it is best to acknowledge this rule for what it is: a device
by which the judiciary can impose its normative choice on the Legislature's act. Favored statutes contain plain and unambiguous language
and contrary legislative history materials can be ignored; unfavored
ambiguous statutes require in-depth judicial construction of the legislature's true intent.6"
II. TOOLS FOR STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Once a Washington court determines a statute is ambiguous, it
may resort to canons of statutory construction, principles developed in
the common law, to give meaning to the legislative action. In fact, the
courts assume the legislature is aware of its rules of construction.6 '
58. The United States Supreme Court in United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 580
(1981), conceded the absence of any guiding standard on this issue: "[T]here is no errorless test
for identifying or recognizing 'plain' or 'unambiguous' language."
59. See Lasky, supra note 41, at 910.
60. An example of how the judiciary imposes its normative values on legislative decisionmaking is found in the Washington State Supreme Court interpretation of the 1981 Product Liability and Tort Reform Act. Although the legislature expressly stated that the standard for failure to warn and defective design products cases was "negligence," WASH. REV. CODE §
7.72.030(1) (2000), the Washington State Supreme Court ignored the statutory language, determining that the standard was strict liability. See Falk v. Keene Corp., 113 Wash. 2d 645, 782
P.2d 974 (1989); see also Soproni v. Polygon Apartment Partners, 137 Wash. 2d 319, 333-34,
971 P.2d 500, 507-08 (1999) (Talmadge, J., dissenting). How the court could reinterpret "negligence" in WASH. REV. CODE § 7.70.010(1) to be "strict liability" was a trick of interpretive legerdemain.
Similarly, the legislature's mandate in the Growth Management Act, WASH. REV. CODE §
36.70A, that interim urban growth boundaries be established by counties to prevent urban level
growth outside the core urban areas of Washington was not respected by the Washington State
Supreme Court in Association of Rural Residents v. Kitsap County, 141 Wash. 2d 185, 4 P.3d 115
(2000), and Wenatchee Sportsmen's Ass'n v. Chelan County, 141 Wash. 2d 169, 4 P.3d 123 (2000).
A boundary was not a boundary, in the Court's view.
Plainly, the Washington State Supreme Court imposed its policy judgment in these cases on
the "plain" legislative language.
61. See, e.g., State v. Blilie, 132 Wash. 2d 484, 492, 939 P.2d 691, 694 (1997) (citing State
ex rel. Gebhardt v. Superior Court, 15 Wash. 2d 673, 690, 131 P.2d 943, 951 (1942)). But Judge
Richard Posner expressed his difficulty with assuming that a legislative body enacts law in light
of judicial methodologies of interpretation:
There is no evidence that members of Congress, or their assistants who do the actual
drafting, know the code [of statutory interpretation] or that if they know, they pay attention to it. Nor, in truth, is there any evidence that they do not; it is remarkable
how little research has been done on the question that one might have thought lawyers
would regard as fundamental to their enterprise. Probably, though, legislators do not
pay attention to it, if only because, as Llewellyn showed, the code is internally incon-
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The court may also resort to legislative history materials, materials
generated inside and outside of the legislative process with respect to
legislation, to attempt to discern what the legislature meant in enacting
a law. Both the canons and legislative history materials have been
used in Washington cases. Each is examined in turn.
A. Canons of Statutory Construction
Like other courts, the Washington judiciary makes reference to
canons of judicial construction as if there were a tidy little volume in a
judicial bookshelf some place that neatly sets forth all the applicable
canons with their precise meaning. Unfortunately, no such exhaustive
authoritative compilation of interpretive rules exists. Washington
courts are free to invent or subtract canons at whim. The best that
one can say about Washington law in this area is that certain canons
have been used repeatedly by Washington courts. I attempt to highlight only a few of these many rules here.
Generally, courts seem to have a love-hate relationship with the
statutory interpretive canons.62 Canons are intended to function as a
basis for decision making, theoretically elevating decisions above mere
result-oriented analysis because the rulings appear grounded in a historically tested maxim. Most members of the legal community appreciate the notorious and fundamental defects intrinsic to the canons
such as their inconsistency and vagueness. 3
Despite these deeply rooted defects, courts seem unable to resist
relying on them. Washington courts are no exception, and the canons
are frequently invoked in Washington cases. While frequently invoked, the precise place of the canons in statutory interpretation is unclear. For example, the cases are not consistent on whether the canons
may be invoked at any point in the statutory analysis or only if the
statute is ambiguous and requires construction.64

sistent. We should demand evidence that statutory draftsmen follow the code before
we erect a method of interpreting statute on the improbable assumption that they do.
Richard Posner, Statutory Interpretation-Inthe Classroom and in the Courtroom, 50 U. CHI. L.
REv. 800, 806 (1983).
62. Canons, or "maxims," of construction were originally conceived of as wise saws, rules
of interpretation that capture some of the wisdom of ages. See SINCLAIR, supra note 32, at 140.
63. The most well-know articulation of the canons' defects came from Karl Llewellyn. See
Karl Llewellyn, Remarks On the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons About How
Statutes Are to Be Constructed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395 (1950).
64. Even in his adherence to textualism, Justice Scalia makes room for the canons of construction:
I thought we had adopted a regular method for interpreting the meaning of language
in a statute: first, find the ordinary meaning of the language in its textual context; and
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One may divide Washington's canons of statutory construction
into two broad canons: textual and extrinsic source.
1. Textual Canons
Textual canons are used to divine the meaning of a statute within
the statute itself by looking to the words of the statutory text as well as
linguistics, grammar, syntax, and the structure of the text for their
strength.
Washington courts have used a variety of linguistic canons including espressio unius, which says that the expression of one thing
suggests the exclusion of others;6 5 noscitur a sociis, which says "the
meaning of words may be indicated or controlled by those with which
they are associated";66 ejusdem generis, which provides a specific statute
will generally supercede a more general one or a general term must be
interpreted to reflect the class of objects reflected in more specific
terms accompanying it;67 the ordinary usage rule which indicates that
"an undefined term should be given its plain and ordinary meaning
unless a contrary legislative intent is indicated";68 the dictionary definition rule, which says a court should follow a recognized dictionary's
definition of terms unless the legislature has provided a specific defini-

second, using establishes canons of construction, ask whether there is any clear indication that some permissible meaning other than the ordinary one applies.
Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 404 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
65. See Washington State Republican Party v. Washington State Pub. Disclosure Comm'n,
141 Wash. 2d 245, 280, 4 P.3d 808, 827 (2000); Nat'l Elec. Contractors Ass'n v. Riveland, 138
Wash. 2d at 17-18 (citing Weyerhauser Co. v. Tri, 117 Wash. 2d 128, 133-134, 814 P.2d 629,
631 (1991)).
66. State v. Jackson, 137 Wash. 2d 712, 729, 976 P.2d 1229, 1237 (1999) (citing Ball v.
Stokley Foods, Inc., 37 Wash. 2d 79, 87-88, 221 P.2d 832 (1950)). See also City of Mercer Island v. Kaltenbach, 60 Wash. 2d 105, 109, 371 P.2d 1009, 1012 (1962); Ball v. Stokely Foods,
Inc., 37 Wash. 2d 79, 87-88, 221 P.2d 832, 837-38 (1950).
67. Simpson Inv. Co. v. State, 141 Wash. 2d 139, 156-57, 3 P.3d 741, 750 (2000) ("In
other words, the precise terms modify, influence or restrict the interpretation or application of
the general terms where both are used in sequence or collocation in legislative enactments."). See
also Nat'l Elec. ContractorsAss'n, 138 Wash. 2d at 24, 978 P.2d at 488 (citing Waste Mgmt. of
Seattle, Inc. v. Utils. & Transp. Comm'n, 123 Wash. 2d 621, 630, 869 P.2d 1034, 1039 (1994);
Davis v. Dep't of Licensing, 137 Wash. 2d 957, 970, 977 P.2d 554, 559 (1999)). This canon,
however, is only supposed to be employed when "the statute contains an enumeration by specific
words which [sic] suggests a class is not 'exhausted by the enumeration."' City of Seattle v.
State, 136 Wash. 2d 693, 699, 965 P.2d 619, 622 (1998) (quoting NORMAN J. SINGER
SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 47.18 (15th ed. 1992)); Dean v. McFarland, 81
Wash. 2d 215, 221, 500 P.2d 1244, 1248 (1972).
68. Ravenscroft v. Washington Water Power Co., 136 Wash. 2d 911, 920, 969 P.2d 75,80
(1998) (citing Cowishe Canyon Conservancy v. Bosley, 118 Wash. 2d 801, 813, 828 P.2d 549,
556 (1992)).
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tion;69 and the "shall" rule, which indicates that the term "may" is
permissive, and does not create a statutory duty, 70 but the term "shall"
usually creates an imperative73 obligation7 1 unless unconstitutional 2 or
contrary to legislative intent.
The Washington State Supreme Court has also applied the
grammar and syntax canons on several occasions, even to the point of
examining the legislature's use of commas and hyphens. 4
Finally, the Washington State Supreme Court routinely relies
upon certain canons pertaining to the structure of the statutory text
when it is doing its textual analysis. These structural maxims provide
that each statutory provision should be read by reference to the whole
act; 75 a court must avoid interpreting a provision in a way that would
render other provisions of the act superfluous or unnecessary; 76 a court
77
should interpret the same or similar terms in a statute the same way;
69. Western Telepage, Inc. v. City of Tacoma, 140 Wash. 2d 599, 609-10, 998 P.2d 884,
890 (2000) (citing C.J.C. v. Corp. of Catholic Bishop, 138 Wash. 2d 699, 709, 985 P.2d 262, 267
(1999)); Ravenscroft, 136 Wash. 2d at 920, 969 P.2d at 80 (1998). In Ravenscroft, where a statute made private landowners liable for "artificial latent conditions," the court looked to the dictionary to define "artificial" and the common law to define "latent" without acknowledging that
the statute had any ambiguity. The court employed these methods while denying an ambiguity
and determining the statute had a "plain meaning." Id. at 922, 924-5, 969 P.2d at 81-82. It is
also interesting to note that in one case, seven different dictionaries were used to arrive at the
plain meaning of words. See Kitsap Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 136 Wash. 2d 567, 964 P.2d 1173
(1998).
70. Nat'l Elec. Contractors Ass'n, 138 Wash. 2d at 28, 978 P.2d at 490 (citing Yakima
County (W. Valley) Fire Prot. Dist. No. 12 v. City of Yakima, 122 Wash. 2d 371, 381, 858 P.2d
245, 251 (1993)).
71. See, e.g., State v. Martin, 137 Wash. 2d 149, 154-55, 975 P.2d 450, 452-53 (1999); see
also State v. Mollichi, 132 Wash. 2d 80, 86, 936 P.2d 408, 411 (1997); State v. Krall, 125 Wash.
2d 146, 148, 881 P.2d 1040, 1041 (1994); Erector Co. v. Dep't of Labor & Indus., 121 Wash. 2d
513, 518, 852 P.2d 288, 291 (1993).
72. See In re Elliott, 74 Wash. 2d 600, 607-610, 446 P.2d 347, 352-54 (1968).
73. See N.W. Natural Gas Co. v. Clark County, 98 Wash. 2d 739, 743, 658 P.2d 669, 671
(1983); Niichel v. Lancaster, 97 Wash. 2d 620, 625, 647 P.2d 1021, 1023 (1982).
74. See In re Personal Restraint of Smith, 139 Wash. 2d 199, 204, 986 P.2d 131, 133-34
(1999) (discussing the "last antecedent" rule of statutory construction); see also In re Sehome Park
Care Ctr., Inc., 127 Wash. 2d 774, 781-82, 903 P.2d 443, 447 (1995) ("the presence of a comma
before the qualifying phrase is evidence the qualifier is intended to apply to all antecedents instead of only the immediately preceding one"). Compare to Simplot v. Knight, 139 Wash. 2d
534, 543-545, 988 P.2d 955, 959-60 (1999) (the use of a hyphen between the payees' names rendered draft patently ambiguous as to the payor's intent).
75. Washington State Republican Party v. Washington State Pub. Disclosure Comm'n,
141 Wash. 2d 245, 280-81, 4 P.3d 808, 827-28 (2000); Davis v. Dep't of Licensing, 137 Wash.
2d 957, 970-71, 977 P.2d 554, 559-60 (1999); City of Seattle v. State, 136 Wash. 2d 693, 698,
965 P.2d 619, 621 (1998); State v. Talley, 122 Wash. 2d 192, 213, 858 P.2d 217, 228-29 (1993).
76. City of Bellevue v. East Bellevue Cmty. Council, 138 Wash. 2d 937, 946-47, 983 P.2d
602, 607 (1999). See also Davis, 137 Wash. 2d at 969, 977 P.2d at 558-59; City of Seattle v.
Dep't of Labor & Indus., 136 Wash. 2d 693, 701, 965 P.2d 619, 623 (1998).
77. Washington State Legislature v. Lowry, 131 Wash. 2d 309, 327, 931 P.2d 885, 894-95
(1997). Seealso Pfeifer v. City of Bellingham, 112 Wash. 2d 562, 569-570, 772 P.2d 1018, 1022
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a court should read provisos and statutory exceptions narrowly; 78 a
court must not create exceptions in addition to those specified by the
Legislature; 79 and a court may treat silence as acquiescence by the
Legislature in judicial interpretations of a statute.80
The textual canons are assumptions about legislative meaning
derived from the use of language, grammar, and sentence structure of
the statute itself. They are generally useful maxims that hue most
closely to the statutory text. It is only when these textual canons rely
upon extrinsic sources such as dictionary definitions that their reliability becomes questionable.
2. Extrinsic Source Canons
In contrast to the textual canons, the extrinsic source canons look
to evidence outside the words of the statute to determine the meaning
of a statute, rendering these canons somewhat less reliable than the
textually based canons previously discussed. These canons look to information derived from the executive branch agencies, the attorney
general, other statutes, the common law, and the constitution to interpret a statute.
Washington courts have frequently relied on administrative
agency rules implementing statutory policy and opinions of the attorney general in construing statutes. Administrative agency rulemaking
pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act,8 and quasi-judicial
administrative decisions 2 are common sources of interpretation of
statutes. Separate quasi-judicial administrative bodies also exist.8 3
Courts often defer to the agency interpretation of a statute unless that
meaning of a statute or is unreainterpretation is contrary to the8 plain
4
court.
the
of
eyes
the
in
sonable
(1989); Garvey v. St. Elizabeth Hosp., 103 Wash. 2d 756, 759, 697 P.2d 248, 249 (1985); State v.
Turpin, 94 Wash. 2d 820, 825, 620 P.2d 990, 993 (1980); State v. Wright, 84 Wash. 2d 645,
652, 529 P.2d 453, 458 (1974).
78. See, e.g., Welch v. Southland Corp., 134 Wash. 2d 629, 636, 952 P.2d 162, 166 (1998).
79. Washington State Republican Party, 141 Wash. 2d at 280-81, 4 P.2d at 827-28.
80. See note 148, infra.
81. WASH. REV. CODE§§ 34.05.310-.395 (2000).
82. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 34.05.410-.494 (2000) (a separate Office of Administrative

Hearings addresses such administrative appeals); WASH. REV. CODE §§34.12.010-.160 (2000).
83. E.g., WASH. REV. CODE §§ 51.52.010-200 (2000) (Board of Industrial Appeals);
WASH. REV. CODE §§ 43.21B.010-.330 (2000) (Pollution Control Hearings Board); WASH.
REV. CODE §§ 36.70A.260-.902 (2000) (Growth Management Hearings Board); WASH. REV.
CODE §§41.56.010-.490 (2000) (Public Employment Relations Commission).
84. See, e.g., Waggoner v. Ace Hardware Co., 134 Wash. 2d 784, 754-55, 953 P.2d 88, 91
(1998); Dep't of Fisheries v. Chelan County PUD No. 1., 91 Wash. 2d 378, 383, 588 P.2d 1146,
1149 (1976); State v. Roth, 78 Wash. 2d 711, 715, 479 P.2d 55, 57-58 (1971). Unlike federal
courts, Washington courts have rarely given administrative rulings a presumption of correctness
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The Washington State Attorney General has the authority to
give formal opinions upon the law by request of elected officials."5
Just as the courts have deferred to agency interpretation of a statute,
Washington courts have given some deference to formal attorney general opinions on the interpretation of a statute.8 6:
A second group of extrinsic canons focuses on the relationship of
an enactment to the larger body of Washington statutory law and interprets the enactment in a fashion designed to render that statutory
law a consistent whole. 7 These canons include the following: the borrowed statute rule, which indicates that where the legislature borrows
a statute, it impliedly adopts the statute's judicial interpretations; 7 the
reenactment rule, which says that when the legislature reenacts a statute, it incorporates settled interpretations of the reenacted statute; ss in
pari materia,
which says similar statutes should be interpreted similarly; 9 the presumption against repeals by implication;9" the rule reunless the ruling is issued from a specialized agency or such a presumption is legislated. See
U.S.W. Communications Inc. v. Washington Utils. & Transp. Comm'n, 134 Wash. 2d 74, 118,
949 P.2d 1337, 1360 (1997); see also ARCO Prods. Co. v. Washington Utils. & Transp.
Comm'n, 125 Wash. 2d 805, 811-12, 888 P.2d 728, 732 (1995); Marguerite M. Sullivan, Brown
& Williamson v. FDA: Finding Congressional Intent Through Creative Statutory InterpretationA Departurefrom Chevron, 94 Nw. U. L. REV. 273,285-291 (1999).
85. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 43.10.030(7), .110 (2000).
86. See, e.g., Seattle Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Apprenticeship & Training Council, 129 Wash. 2d 787, 803, 920 P.2d 581, 588 (1996) (Attorney General opinions (AGO) are
entitled to great weight); see also Washington Educ. Ass'n v. Smith, 96 Wash. 2d 601, 606, 638
P.2d 77, 80 (1981). But see Washington Fed'n of State Employees v. Office of Fin. Mgmt., 121
Wash. 2d 152, 164, 849 P.2d 1201, 1207 (1993) (an AGO is entitled to less weight when it is
interpreting a statute). Notably, the Washington State Supreme Court has "held that an AGO
'constitutes notice to the Legislature of the Department's interpretation of the law,' finding acquiescence where the Legislature had not subsequently acted to 'overturn the Department's interpretation."' City of Seattle v. State, 136 Wash. 2d 693, 703, 965 P.2d 619, 624 (1998) (citing
Bowles v. Dep't of Ret. Sys., 121 Wash. 2d 52, 63-64, 847 P.2d 440, 446 (1993)).
87. See Town of Republic v. Brown, 97 Wash. 2d 915, 917-18, 652 P.2d 955, 957 (1982);
Jenkins v. Bellingham Mun. Court, 95 Wash. 2d 574, 627 P.2d 1316 (1981); Pac. First Fed. Sav.
& Loan Ass'n v. Pierce County, 27 Wash. 2d 347, 355, 178 P.2d 351, 355 (1967). Compare with
In re Taylor, 105 Wash. 2d 67, 69-70, 711 P.2d 345, 347 (1985) ("Absent a clearer indication of
legislative intent, we cannot accept petitioner's theory of incorporation.").
88. See Longview Fibre Co. v. Cowlitz Co., 114 Wash. 2d 691, 698, 790 P.2d 149, 153
(1990) (a mere Attorney General Opinion prior to reenactment was "settled" enough for the
Court); see also Washington Educ. Ass'n, 96 Wash. 2d at 606, 638 P.2d at 80; Ellis v. Dep't of
Labor & Indus., 88 Wash. 2d 844, 567 P.2d 224 (1977); McKinney v. Estate of MacDonald, 71
Wash. 2d 262, 427 P.2d 974 (1967); Yakima Valley Bank & Trust Co. v. Yakima City, 149
Wash. 552, 271 P. 820 (1928).
89. State v. Tili, 139 Wash. 2d 107, 985 P.2d 365 (1999). See also Enter. Leasing v. City of
Tacoma, 139 Wash. 2d 546, 554-6, 988 P.2d 961, 966 (1999); Harmon v. DSHS, 134 Wash. 2d
523, 542, 951 P.2d 770, 779 (1998).
90. Gilbert v. Sacred Heart Hosp., 127 Wash. 2d 370, 375, 900 P.2d 552, 554 (1995). See
also Jenkins v. State, 85 Wash. 2d 883, 540 P.2d 1363 (1975) (implied repeals are disfavored);
Herrett Trucking Co. v. State Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 58 Wash. 2d 542, 364 P.2d 505 (1961). But
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quiring interpretation of provisions consistently with subsequent
statutory amendments;91 the rule of continuity, which assumes that the
legislature did not create discontinuities in legal rights and obligations
without some clear statement;92 and courts presume when the legislature acts, it intends to change existing law.93
A third group of extrinsic source canons addresses the relationship of a statute to the common law and include: a presumption in favor of following common law usage where the legislature has employed words or concepts with well-settled common law traditions; 94 a
presumption that the legislature is aware of prior law including judicial or administrative interpretations of statutes; 95 and a presumption
in favor of prospective application of a statute and its corollary canon,
which rejects retroactive application of statutes.96

see Walton v. Absher Const. Co., Inc., 101 Wash. 2d 238, 242, 676 P.2d 1002, 1004 (1984)
("However, an implied repeal will be found where: (1) the later act covers the entire subject matter of the earlier legislation, is complete in itself, and is evidently intended to supersede prior legislation on the subject; or (2) the two acts are so clearly inconsistent with, and repugnant to, each
other that they cannot be reconciled and both given effect by a fair and reasonable construction.") (citing In re Chi-Dooh Li, 79 Wash. 2d 561, 563, 488 P.2d 259, 261 (1971)).
91. See State v. Blilie, 132 Wash. 2d 484, 939 P.2d 691 (1997); see also Brown, 97 Wash. 2d
at 917-18, 625 P.2d at 957; State v. Horton, 59 Wash. App. 412, 416, 798 P.2d 813, 815-16
(1990).
92. See, e.g., State Dep't of Ecology v. Theodoratus, 135 Wash. 2d 582, 589, 957 P.2d
1241, 1244 (1998); seealsoCity of Pasco v. Pub. Employment Relations Comm'n, 119 Wash. 2d
504, 507, 833 P.2d 381, 382 (1992); Pasco Police Officers' Ass'n v. City of Pasco, 132 Wash. 2d
450, 458, 938 P.2d 827, 832; Cowiche Canyon Conservancy v. Bosley, 118 Wash. 2d 801, 828
P.2d 549 (1992).
93. Spokane County Health Dist. v. Brockett, 120 Wash. 2d 140, 154, 839 P.2d 324, 331
(1992). See also Johnson v. Morris, 87 Wash. 2d 922, 926, 557 P.2d 1299, 1303 (1976); Fisher
Flouring Mills Co. v. State, 35 Wash. 2d 482, 490, 213 P.2d 938, 942 (1950). "It is not to be
presumed that a legislative body would enact a statute without other purpose than to declare
what is already indisputably and confessedly the law." United States v. Douglas-Willan Sartoris
Co., 22 P. 92, 94 (Wyo. 1889). But a legislative body may clarify an earlier enactment where an
ambiguity arose about the statute. State v. Riles, 135 Wash. 2d 326, 343, 957 P.2d 655, 663
(1998).
94. "Presumption in favor of following common law usage where Legislature has employed
words or concepts with well-settled..." as they looked to common law settled definition of "latent." Ravenscroft v. Washington Water Power Co., 136 Wash. 2d 911, 924, 969 P.2d 75, 82
(1998). See also In re Recall of Pearsall-Stipek, 141 Wash. 2d 756, 10 P.3d 1034 (2000); In re
Tyler's Estate, 140 Wash. 679, 689, 250 P. 456, 460 (1926).
95. Dep't of Transp. v. State Employee Ins. Bd., 97 Wash. 2d 454, 462, 645 P.2d 1076,
1080 (1982).
96. State v. T.K., 139 Wash. 2d 320, 329, 987 P.2d 63, 67-68 (1974). See also In re
Shepard, 127 Wash. 2d 185, 898 P.2d 828 (1995); Yellam v. Woerner, 77 Wash. 2d 604, 464
P.2d 947 (1970); State v. Belgarde, 119 Wash. 2d 711, 722, 837 P.2d 599, 604-05 (1992) ("A
statute operates prospectively when the precipitating event for [its] application ... occurs after
the effective date of the statute, even though the precipitating event had its origin in a situation
existing prior to the enactment of the statute.") (quoting Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Washington Life
& Disability Ins. Guar. Ass'n, 83 Wash. 2d 523, 535, 520 P.2d 162, 170 (1974)). But see McGee
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A final group of extrinsic canons addresses the relationship of
statutory enactments to overarching constitutional principles. Courts
generally interpret a statute so as to avoid constitutional problems."
Courts also interpret statutes to favor judicial review, especially for
constitutional questions.9" In the criminal context, principles of lenity99 may have their roots in constitutional concerns.' 00
3.

A Detailed Example of a Canon in Operation

To place these canons of statutory interpretation in appropriate
perspective, it is useful to view a canon in application in an actual case.
The doctrine of in pari materia is a useful example of such a canon in
operation.
In pari materiais an old canon, which has been used in Washington for at least eighty-seven years. 1 ' In fact, it is held in such high regard, the Washington State Supreme Court has called it "a cardinal
rule,"' 2 describing it as follows:
In ascertaining legislative purpose, statutes which stand in pari
materia are to be read together as constituting a unified whole, to
the end that a harmonious, total statutory scheme evolves which
maintains the integrity of the respective statutes. Also, the entire sequence of statutes relating to a given subject matter should
Guest Home, Inc. v. Dep't of Soc. and Health Servs., 142 Wash. 2d 316, 12 P.3d 144 (2000)
(curative or remedial amendment may be retroactive).
97. Washington State Republican Party v. Washington State Pub. Disclosure Comm'n,
141 Wash. 2d 245, 280, 4 P.3d 808, 827 (2000). See also Duskin v. Carlson, 136 Wash. 2d 550,
557, 965 P.2d 611, 614 (1998); City of Seattle v. Montana, 129 Wash. 2d 583, 590, 919 P.2d
1218, 1222 (1996).
98. This presumption in favor ofjudicial review is furthered by the rule that constitutional
questions are reviewed de novo. See Washam v. Sonntag, 74 Wash. App. 504, 507, 874 P.2d
188, 191 (1994).
99. Washington Courts accept the rule of lenity. See, e.g., State v. Tili, 139 Wash. 2d 107,
113, 985 P.2d 365, 369 (1999); see also In re Personal Restraint of Hopkins, 137 Wash. 2d 897,
901, 976 P.2d 616, 617 (1999). The rule of lenity comes into play only when there are two reasonable interpretations of a criminal statute. In re Post-Sentencing Review of Charles, 135
Wash. 2d 239, 250, 955 P.2d 798, 803 (1998).
100. For example, statutes involving a deprivation of liberty are strictly construed. In re
Cross, 99 Wash. 2d 373, 379, 662 P.2d 828, 832 (1983). See also In re Carson, 84 Wash. 2d 969,
973, 530 P.2d 331, 333 (1975).
101. See State v. Savidge, 75 Wash. 116, 120, 134 P. 680, 682 (1913) (where statutes are
part of a general system relating to the same class of subjects and rest upon the same reasons,
they should be so construed, if possible, as to be uniform in their application and in the results
which they accomplish); see also White v. City of N. Yakima, 87 Wash. 191, 195, 151 P. 645,
647 (1915) ("Laws that are in pari materia will be read together for the purpose of ascertaining
the legislative intent.").
102. State v. Fairbanks, 25 Wash. 2d 686, 690, 171 P.2d 845, 848 (1946) ("It is a cardinal
rule that two statutes dealing with the same subject will, if possible, be so construed as to preserve the integrity of both.").
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be considered, since legislative policy changes as economic and
sociological conditions change."0 3
The Court has relied on the canon in numerous instances, even
where the provisions were passed in different bills in the same session:
Statutes in pari materia should be harmonized as to give force
and effect to each[,] and this rule applies with peculiar force to
statutes passed at the same session of the Legislature.... Although the two provisions had been acted on under separate
bills, this court found that its obligation to harmonize statutes in
pari materia was even greater when the
10 4two statutes had been
enacted in the same legislative session."
As with so many canons, in pari materia may be manipulated to
achieve a particular result."0 ' The rule was applied in different cases
involving the same set of facts, for example a sting operation was conducted and the two defendants were arrested for manufacturing
40,000 M-80's and 200 tennis balls filled with flash powder, or tennis
ball bombs. The sting operation was undertaken after an eight-yearold both blew his hand off and had sheetrock and ceiling pieces
imbedded into his fingers and bones after he found a tennis ball bomb
in his brother's closet and lit it in the family's fireplace. 16
An issue on review was whether the device was regulated under
the Explosives Act or the Fireworks Act. The Explosives Act specifically does not regulate fireworks,.. 7 hence the fireworks that the defendants were manufacturing might have been exempt from the fireworks law."0 8 Thus, the defendants sought to avoid punishment under
either act.
The defendants initially pled guilty to violations of the Explosives Act,"0 9 but later sought to withdraw their plea, arguing that what
103. State v. Wright, 84 Wash. 2d 645, 650, 529 P.2d 453, 457 (1974) (citing Connick v.
Chehalis, 53 Wash. 2d 288, 333 P.2d 647 (1958)).
104. Harmon v. Pierce County Bldg. Dep't, 106 Wash. 2d 32, 36-37, 720 P.2d 433, 435
(quoting Int'l Commercial Collectors, Inc. v. Carver, 99 Wash. 2d 302, 307, 661 P.2d 976
(1983)).
105. See In re Personal Restraint of Yim, 139 Wash. 2d 581, 989 P.2d 512 (1999).
106. State v. Yokley, 91 Wash. App. 773, 774-75, 959 P.2d 694, 695 (1998).
107. WASH. REV. CODE § 70.74.010(3) provides in pertinent part: "For the purposes of
this chapter small arms ammunition, small arms ammunition primers, smokeless powder not
exceeding five pounds, and black powder not exceeding five pounds shall not be defined as explosives ....
" Further, WASH. REV. CODE § 70.74.010(27) states that "[tihe term 'pyrotechnic'
shall be held to mean and include any combustible explosive compositions or manufactured articles designed and prepared for the purpose of producing audible or visible effects which are
commonly referred to as fireworks."
108. Yim, 139 Wash. 2d at 592-94, 989 P.2d at 517-18. See generally WASH. REV. CODE
§§ 70.77.126, .236 (2000).
109. WASH. REv. CODE § 70.74 (2000).
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they had actually manufactured were legal fireworks under section
70.77 of the Washington Revised Code. 1 ° The majority found the
Explosives Act and the Fireworks Act should be read in pari materia
because they each "govern the manufacture, purchase, sale, possession, transportation, et cetera, of potentially dangerous explosive devices, [and so] stand in pari materia due to the fact that they relate to
the same person or thing, or the same class of persons or things.... In
so holding, the majority in effect agreed with the lower court's decision to ignore the plain meaning rule, reasoning that it would be "absurd" for the explosives that the defendants manufactured to be unregulated by both the Explosives Act and the Fireworks Act."1
The dissent disagreed with the treating of the Explosives Act and
the fireworks law in pari materia, arguing that it could not read the
statutes in pari materia because one statute (the Explosives Act) predated the other (the Fireworks Act)."' The dissent asserted that the
fireworks and explosives statutes could not be within the same statutory scheme because of the time difference in their enactment. Since
the men were charged under the explosives statute, the dissent found
the Explosive Act unambiguous, and the search for legislative intent
by employing the canon of in pari materia was improper, warning that
"[t]o broaden the use of in pari materia beyond these narrow boundaries-i.e., using it as a vessel to navigate beyond distinct statutory enlegislative intent by judicial
actments-is to usurp the sought-after
11 4
cloth.
whole
of
out
construction
There is no direct link between the Explosives Act and the Fireworks Act. Consequently, different philosophies of statutory interpretation were used by the majority and dissent. Ultimately, the result in
the case may be dictated by the tragedy that befell the child, rather
than a clear articulation of the canon.
By plucking out useful canons and utilizing their rhetorical skill,
different judges steer the same facts in different directions. This ability to achieve different results by using different canons is both the
genius and curse of the canons.
To the uninitiated, or perhaps the cynical, Karl Llewellyn's acute
observation that for each canon of statutory interpretation, there is an
equal and opposite canon of judicial interpretation bears repetition."1
110. Yim, 139 Wash. 2d 581, 989 P.2d 512.

111. Id. at 591-92, 989 P.2d at 517-18.
112. Yokely, 91 Wash. App. 773, 779-80, 959 P.2d at 698.
113. Yim, 139 Wash. 2d at 559-60, 989 P.2d 521-22 (Sanders, J., dissenting).
114. Id. at 601, 989 P.2d at 522.
115. Karl Llewelyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons
About How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395 (1950).
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Llewellyn was thus prompted to observe that the canons held little
meaning:
When it comes to presenting a proposed construction in court,
there is an accepted conventional vocabulary. As in argument
over points of case-law, the accepted convention still[] unhappily requires discussion as if only one single correct meaning
could exist. Hence[,] there are two opposing canons on almost
every point. An arranged selection is appended. Every lawyer
must be familiar with them all: they are still needed tools of argument. At least as early as Fortescue[,] the general picture was
clear, on this, to any eye which would see.
Plainly, to make any canon take hold in a particular instance, the
construction contended for must be sold, essentially, by means
other than the use of the canon: the good sense of the situation
and a simple construction of the available language to 1achieve
6
that sense, by tenable means, out of the statutory languageLlewellyn's observation was echoed by Justice Finley in Schneider v. Forcier'17 Llewelyn's criticism may be apt.
116. Id. at 401.
117. 67 Wash. 2d 161, 167-68, 406 P.2d 935, 939 (1965) (Finley, J., dissenting) (quoting
Felix Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 527, 544
(1947)):
The essence of the matter is the fact that the rules or maxims of statutory interpretation should be recognized and treated as nothing more than aids or tools which [sic]
may or may not be pertinent or useful in determining the meaning of statutory language. There is nothing mandatory about the applicability of a rule of statutory interpretation, i.e., nothing compelling in an ultimate sense in determining the meaning
of statutory language. See for instance In re Horse Heaven IrrigationDist. ... wherein
this realistic approach to the rules of construction was adopted as the law of this state.
Actually, today it should be clear without citation of authority and without prolonged
explanation, that every statutory maxim or rule of interpretation has its countervailing
or opposite maxim or rule. As Mr. Justice Frankfurter said: "Nor can canons of construction save us from the anguish of judgment. Such canons give an air of abstract
intellectual compulsion to what is in fact a delicate judgment concluding a complicated process of balancing subtle and elusive elements. Insofar as canons of construction are generalizations of experience, they all have worth. In the abstract, they rarely
arouse controversy. Difficulties emerge when canons compete in soliciting judgment,
because they conflict rather than converge. For the demands of judgment underlying
the art of interpretation, there is no vademecum."
Llewelyn's comments on the interpretive canons have not always been accepted. Another commentator, William Eskridge, Jr., observed that Llewelyn's comment on opposite canons meant,
"The canons have no independent value in statutory interpretation and are just window dressing
for results reached for other reasons." William Eskridge, Jr., Norms, Empiricism, and Canons in
Statutory Interpretation, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 671, 679 (1999). But Eskridge believes it would be
difficult to test if the canons constrain judges or make interpretation more predictable: "The democratic value potentially served by the canons needs to be tempered by the observation that our
polity might not want statutory interpretation always to mimic the results reached or would have
been reached by the legislature." Id. at 681. Eskridge candidly espouses a role for the courts
permitting them to disregard legislative intent.
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If there are often conflicting interpretive canons for virtually
every eventuality, the canons offer little practical guidance to the
courts in their interpretive role. No single interpretive canon appears
to have greater moment than another. This leaves the judiciary extremely wide latitude to substitute its own normative values for those
of the legislature, the ostensible authors of the legislation. As noted
earlier, the canons are not analytically precise in number, scope, or usage. The Washington State Supreme Court should decide with
greater precision when the canons should be used in statutory construction, what canons should be employed, and the relative authoritative value of the canons in the judiciary's function of statutory analysis.
B. Legislative History
The ultimate extrinsic canon of statutory interpretation is found
in the materials of the legislative process itself. When the language of
the statute is ambiguous or the standard rules of interpretation are not
helpful, Washington case law has recognized a variety of possible
sources to discover the intent of the legislature in enacting a statute. 118
However, the courts have not been entirely consistent in their treatment of these sources.
Of greatest utility are legislative findings in a preamble section of
a bill as the findings represent an affirmative statement of legislative
intent enacted by the legislature.119 Similarly, official section-bysection comments adopted by the legislature as part of the journal of
one or both houses also retain a sense of official imprimatur to a particular interpretation of an enactment."' Plainly, these contemporaneous, collective expressions of legislative purpose are more significant
than the individual, non-contemporaneous thoughts of legislators and
others. After all, when divining legislative intent, the courts are looking to the collective decision of 147 legislators in a particular legislative
session. The thoughts of a legislator or lobbyist expressed long after
that session may have been affected by bias or the sheer passage of
time.
118. See generally Arthur Wang, Legislative History in Washington, 7 U. PUGET SOUND L.
REv. 571 (1984).
119. See Spokane County Health Dist. v. Brockett, 120 Wash. 2d 140, 839 P.2d 324
(1992); see also Oliver v. Harborview Med. Ctr., 94 Wash. 2d 559, 618 P.2d 76 (1980); Hartman
v. Washington State Game Comm'n, 85 Wash. 2d 176, 179, 532 P.2d 614, 616 (1975); Whatcorn County v. Langlie, 40 Wash. 2d 855, 246 P.2d 836 (1952); State ex rel. Berry v. Superior
Court, 92 Wash. 16, 159 P. 92 (1916).
120. Equipto Div. Aurora Equip. Co. v. Yarmouth, 134 Wash. 2d 356, 366, 950 P.2d 451,
456 (1998).

Seattle University Law Review

[Vol. 25:179

Courts have also looked to official documents of the legislature
such as bill reports, which are the product of the legislative staff, as
authoritative sources of legislative intent.12 ' Similarly, an official
document used by the legislature in its deliberations such as a fiscal
note, detailing the financial implications of a bill may be used to determine legislative intent, 122 but some caution here may be in order as
fiscal notes are ordinarily prepared by the executive or judicial branch
agency charged with administration of the proposed law, 123 and the
24
note may reflect agency bias with regard to the bill.
Transactional materials, those materials generated in the course
of the enactment of the legislation, may also serve as a basis for understanding the legislature's work. Various drafts of a proposed bill can
be very revealing as to the legislature's intent with regard to the final
statutory language. 125 The court may look to model or uniform acts as
sources where the legislature enacts such legislation. 126 Committee
work, including statements of legislators during committee sessions;
both oral and written testimony of witnesses before the relevant legislative committees; contemporaneous letters of legislators; and staff
memoranda on the legislation can be of assistance in learning legisla-

121. See Young v. Estate of Snell, 134 Wash. 2d 267, 280, 948 P.2d 1291, 1297 (1997); see
also Noble Manor v. Pierce County, 133 Wash. 2d 269, 277-78, 943 P.2d 1378, 1383 (1997);
State v. Reding, 119 Wash. 2d 685, 690, 835 P.2d 1019, 1021-22 (1992); Biggs v. Vail, 119
Wash. 2d 129, 134-36, 830 P.2d 350, 353-54 (1992); Johnson v. Cont'l W., Inc., 99 Wash. 2d
555, 663 P.2d 482 (1983). But see State v. Shore, 113 Wash. 2d 83, 90, 776 P.2d 132, 136 (1989)
(criticizing bill report accuracy).
122. See Davis v. Dep't of Licensing, 137 Wash. 2d 957, 977 P.2d 554 (1999); see also City
of Ellensburg v. State, 118 Wash. 2d 709, 717, 826 P.2d 1081, 1085 (1992).
123. See WASH. REV. CODE § 43.88A.010 (2000); see also WASH. REV. CODE §
43.88A.020 (2000) (office of financial management to coordinate development of fiscal notes
with appropriate state agencies).
124. See SEEBERGER, supra note 29, at 54, 56.
125. Sequential drafts of a bill may be indicative of legislative intent. Howlett v.
Cheetham, 17 Wash. 626, 632, 50 P. 522, 524 (1897). See also Spokane County Health Dist. v.
Brockett, 120 Wash. 2d 140, 153, 839 P.2d 324, 331 (1992); Bellevue Firefighters Local 1604 v.
City of Bellevue, 100 Wash. 2d 748, 750-51, 675 P.2d 592, 594 (1984); State v. Frampton, 95
Wash. 2d 469, 475-78, 627 P.2d 922, 925-26 (1981). But see Hama Hama Co. v. Shorelines
Hearing Bd., 85 Wash. 2d 441, 450, 536 P.2d 157, 162-63 (1975) (criticizing the reliance on sequential drafts). The rejection of a particular amendment by the legislature may not be used by
the judiciary to ascertain legislative intent. Spokane County Health Dist., 120 Wash. 2d at 153,
839 P.2d at 331. See also Wilmot v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 118 Wash. 2d 46, 6364, 821 P.2d 18, 26 (1991). But see State v. Clark, 129 Wash. 2d 805, 812-13, 920 P.2d 187, 190
(1996) (rejected amendment indicative of legislature's intent); Buchanan v. Simplot Feeders Ltd.
P'ship, 134 Wash. 2d 673, 688, 952 P.2d 610, 617 (1998) (legislative history of unenacted bill
relevant).

126. McCarver v. Manson Park & Recreation Dist., 92 Wash. 2d 370, 374, 597 P.2d 1362,
1364 (1974). See also In Re Marriage of Little, 96 Wash. 2d 183, 191 n.3, 634 P.2d 498, 503 n.3
(1981).
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tive intent. 127 Materials pertaining to activities on the floor of each
house of the legislature are also significant interpretive tools. Wash128
ington courts have used legislative debates in construing statutes,
but have been more reluctant to use the colloquy of legislators reported in legislative journals'29 as these colloquies are often staged for
the benefit of the courts. 3 '
It is difficult to reconcile the disparate judicial treatment of floor
colloquies in the case law. In Johnson, 3' the Washington State Supreme Court found value in the exchange between the former chair of
the Senate Select Committee on Product Liability and Tort Reform
and the vice-chair of the Senate Judiciary Committee on an issue involving the 1981 Product Liability and Tort Reform Act.'32 However,
in North CoastAir Services,'33 the court declined to give pay significant
heed to the exchange of two key members of that same select committee on the interpretation of that same 1981 legislation even though the
exchange related to the precise issue before the court and indicated a
clear legislative intent to overrule the court's decision in Ohler.'34
127. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Kovacs, 121 Wash. 2d 795, 854 P.2d 629 (1993) (letter,
remarks of committee chair, and prime sponsor of bill to other house); see also Biggs v. Vail, 119
Wash. 2d 129, 135, 830 P.2d 350, 353 (1992) (Bar Association statement); State v. Turner, 98
Wash. 2d 731, 658 P.2d 658 (1983) (committee action, staff analyses, hearing testimony); State v.
Anderson, 94 Wash. 2d 176, 616 P.2d 612 (1980) (committee memoranda, transcript); State v.
Herrmann, 89 Wash. 2d 349, 572 P.2d 713 (1977) (letter).
In Nelson v. McClatchy Newspapers, Inc., 131 Wash. 2d 523, 936 P.2d 1123 (1997), the court
cited a staff memorandum as authority for an interpretation of a statute. Id. at 531, 936 P.2d at
1127. But subsequently in the opinion, the court indicated a staff memorandum on a bill introduced after the initiation of the litigation was not authoritative in describing legislative intent.
Id. at 532 n.5, 936 P.2d at 1127 n.5.
128. See CLEAN v. State, 130 Wash. 2d 782, 810, 928 P.2d 1054, 1067 (1996); see also
Sofie v. Fibreboard Corp., 112 Wash. 2d 636, 771 P.2d 711 (1989) (legislative floor remarks),
amended by 55 Wash. App. 685, 780 P.2d 260 (1989). But see In re F.D. Processing, Inc., 119
Wash. 2d 452, 832 P.2d 1303 (1992) (one legislator's floor remarks not enough to establish legislative intent).
129. See Snow's Mobile Homes, Inc. v. Morgan, 80 Wash. 2d 283, 494 P.2d 216 (1972)
(colloquy recognized); see also Johnson v. Cont'l W., Inc., 99 Wash. 2d 555, 663 P.2d 482 (1983)
(colloquy recognized). But see N. Coast Air Servs. Ltd. v. Grumman Corp., 111 Wash. 2d 315,
759 P.2d 405 (1988) (colloquy not recognized).
130. SEEBERGER, supra note 29, at 72; see also Wang, supra note 118, at 591.
131. 99 Wash. 2d 555, 663 P.2d 482 (1983).
132. Id., 99 Wash. 2d at 561, 663 P.2d at 485.
133. 111 Wash. 2d 315, 759 P.2d 405 (1988).
134. The court stated:
We are not persuaded that this floor exchange supports defendant's position. First,
the answer of a single legislator should not create an intent different from that in the
official committee report if the answer is inconsistent with the report. Second, the
question and answer are ambiguous. Senator Bottiger said the bill would overrule Ohler, but to overrule Ohler would eliminate the discovery rule in product cases. That is
not the effect of this statute; indeed it statutorily recognizes a different form of what
had been a judicially created discovery rule. The statute, despite the floor colloquy,
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An additional source of legislative intent is found in the action of
the governor. A gubernatorial veto is deemed part of the legislative
process. 135 Thus, veto messages of the governor are significant sources
of legislative intent.'36
The least significant legislative construction tools are those materials created after the enactment of the legislation. Generally, the
courts have not valued declarations of legislative intent offered by legislators 13 7 or lobbyists; 138 however, law review articles prepared by legislators commenting on legislation have been used to construe stat39
utes. 1
In this discussion of interpretive sources for legislative intent, the
author has intentionally grouped the materials in descending order of
persuasive force. For example, legislative materials expressing an official, contemporaneous, and collective intention, such as the preamble
to a bill, have greater persuasive force than a lobbyist's declaration
submitted years after the bill's enactment. But it is important to note
that no statute or case law gives official sanction to such an ordering of
the persuasive power of legislative source materials.
In his excellent article on legislative history in Washington, former Representative Art Wang argued for greater legislative attention
to its materials designed to describe the legislature's intention in enacting a bill. Specifically, Wang suggested the creation of a joint select
legislative committee to study the issue of legislative history. This
committee would examine such diverse suggestions as publication of
bill reports and fiscal notes in the legislative journal, create conference
committee reports, and provide for a legislatively controlled repository
did not overrule Ohler, it modified the conditions necessary to trigger running of the
statute of limitations.
N. CoastAir Servs., 111 Wash. 2d at 326, 759 P.2d at 410.
135. Allied Daily Newspapers v. Eikenberry, 121 Wash. 2d 205, 213, 848 P.2d 1258, 1262
(1993). See also State ex Tel. Stiner v. Yelle, 174 Wash. 402, 408, 25 P.2d 91, 93 (1933).
136. State Dep't of Ecology v. Theodoratus, 135 Wash. 2d 582, 594, 957 P.2d 1241, 1247
(1998). See also Spokane County Health Dist. v. Brockett, 120 Wash. 2d 140, 153-54, 839 P.2d
324, 331; State v. Anderson, 81 Wash. 2d 234, 240, 501 P.2d 184, 188 (1972).
137. See, e.g., Woodson v. State, 95 Wash. 2d 257, 623 P.2d 683 (1980); see also, e.g., City
of Yakima v. Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters, AFL-CIO, Local 469, 117 Wash. 2d 655, 818 P.2d
1076 (1991); City of Spokane v. State, 198 Wash. 682, 687, 89 P.2d 826, 828-29 (1939).
138. See, e.g., W. Telepage, Inc. v. City of Tacoma, 140 Wash. 2d 599, 611, 998 P.2d 884,
891 (2000) (noncontemporaneous understanding of lobbyist as to legislative intent not reflective
of legislature's rationale for enacting law). "While lobbyists refer to themselves as the 'Third
House,' this appellation has no grounding in our [c]onstitution." Id. at 611 n.6, 998 P.2d at 891
n.6.
139. See, e.g., Johnson v. Cont'l W., Inc., 99 Wash. 2d 555, 560, 663 P.2d 482, 485 (1983);
see also, e.g., Scott v. Cascade Structures, 100 Wash. 2d 537, 673 P.2d 179 (1983). But see
Anderson, 94 Wash. 2d at 188, 501 P.2d at 618 (nonlegislative authors of manual for Criminal
Justice Training Commission).
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for legislative history materials. 4 ' Wang did not describe how the
courts should approach the interpretation of legislation. Although the
joint select committee was never appointed, Wang's suggestions remain valuable recommendations of a thoughtful legislator.
While Washington courts have resorted to legislative history materials when in doubt about a statute's meaning, this approach has
generally not been criticized. In contrast, interpretation of federal
statutes by the United States Supreme Court has spawned a firestorm
of controversy on the Court itself and by legal scholars.
Justice Antonin Scalia has been the foremost Court proponent of
a new statutory interpretation style that eschews any reliance on legislative history. Justice Scalia's most succinct articulation of this view is
found in Green v. Bock Laundry Machine Co.:
The meaning of terms on the statute books ought to be determined, not on the basis of which meaning can be shown to have
been understood by a larger handful of the Members of Congress; but rather on the basis of which meaning is (1) most in accord with context and ordinary usage, and thus most likely to
have been understood by the whole Congress which [sic] voted
on the words of the statute (not to mention the citizens subject
to it), and (2) most compatible with the surrounding body of law
into which the provision must be integrated-a compatibility
which [sic], by a benign fiction, we assume Congress always has
in mind. I would not permit any of the historical and legislative
material discussed by the Court, or all of it combined, to lead me
to a result different from the one that these factors suggest.'
Scalia's approach, often termed "formalism" or "new textualism," ' is allegedly more democratic, relying on the proper role of legislative bodies in a democratic system.
In contrast, many commentators argue in response to Scalia for a
more normative-based statutory interpretive model with the judiciary
enjoying the power to ignore legislative history materials in favor of
selecting certain key interpretive canons to make the best policy decision.143
The apparent flaw in all of the interpretive approaches, however,
is the omission of the legislative branch, the very body whose intent
the judiciary is in theory executing. The legislative branch certainly

140. Wang, supra note 118, at 604-05.
141. 490 U.S. 504, 528 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring).
142. See Philip P. Frickey, Revisiting the Revival of Theory in Statutory Interpretation: A
Lecture in Honorof Irving Younger, 84 MINN. L. REV. 199, 204-05 (1999).
143. See Eskridge, supra note 117, at 684.
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has a stake in how its views are interpreted. This stake is nowhere discussed in most statutory interpretation theories.
The legislature has not taken steps to better ensure that the
courts truly execute its purpose in adopting legislation. Recognizing
statutory interpretation as a key feature of separation of powers, it is
crucial that the legislature address both the legislative history materials
it generates and the interpretation of its enactments by the courts.
Similarly, it is important for the court to treat the interpretation of
statutes in a more coherent and realistic fashion. Toward these goals,
a new paradigm for statutory interpretation in Washington is appropriate and possible.
III. A NEW PARADIGM FOR STATUTORY INTERPRETATION IN
WASHINGTON

The responsibility for developing a better system for interpreting
statutes is jointly that of the legislature and the courts, each within
their respective constitutional spheres. Although the courts may be
the final authority on the interpretation of a statute,1 44 the legislature
can prescribe what its objectives were in passing a law, indicate how a
particular statute is to be treated by the courts, and express what materials regarding the legislative history of an enactment are authoritative. In turn, the courts can adopt more coherent, and less resultdriven, principles of statutory interpretation, adhering more directly to
the textual language employed by the legislature.
A. Legislature
The legislature should address statutory interpretation in several
significant ways: by modifying how it drafts legislation, by amending
section 1.12 of the Washington Revised Code to establish specific
principles for guiding courts in their interpretation of the legislature's
intent, and by carefully analyzing court decisions interpreting statutes
to ensure that the judicial interpretation comports with the legislature's aims.
With respect to the first issue, the legislature, including members, legislative staff, and code reviser staff, can do more to advise the
courts as to the reasons for a bill's enactment and the legislature's intent with regard to the bill. While not necessary for routine legislation, for significant legislative acts, the legislature should employ a
preamble with findings as to the problems that the legislature hopes to
address and the solutions intended. The legislature should consider
144. See note 17, supra.
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incorporation of an official section-by-section analysis of the bill in the
final bill report on a bill. 145 Finally, the bill should contain a section
with specific directions-such as liberal or strict construction-for
specific sections of the legislation.
Apart from legislative direction as to specific legislation, the legislature should amend section 1.12 to provide general guidance to the
courts in interpreting a statute. At a minimum, the legislature should
indicate to the courts the hierarchy of interpretive tools beginning with
the official bill reports. The legislature may even choose to direct the
courts to disregard certain interpretive tools; for example, the noncontemporaneous testimony of legislators, lobbyists, and others may
be rendered inadmissible on legislative intent. The decision about
which of its own materials-bill reports, fiscal notes, committee materials and testimony, floor debates, or post-enactment declarationsreveals the actual collective intention of the legislature in enacting a
bill is peculiarly within the purview of the legislature itself.'46
Finally, the most significant power of the legislature to ensure
that judicial interpretations of its enactments are consistent with the
legislature's intent is its amendatory power. If the legislature disagrees
with a judicial decision interpreting a statute, it should immediately
amend the statute to make the interpretation consistent with its
views.' 47 Indeed, the failure of the legislature to amend a statute in the
face of a judicial interpretation has been viewed by48the courts as acquiescence in the judicial construction of the statute.1
B. The Judiciary
The decisional law of Washington's judiciary on statutory interpretation suffers from the lack of coherent and consistent principles.
The standard treatment of statutes-evaluate the statute to determine
if it is ambiguous and construe it using a variety of interpretive canons
145. See, e.g., 1981 WASH. SENATE JOURNAL 629-637 (section-by-section analysis of
1981 Product Liability and Tort Reform Act).
146. Courts have made clear that they want the legislature to maintain historical materials
for court use. Seattle Times v. Benton County, 99 Wash. 2d 251, 255 n.1, 661 P.2d 964, 966 n.1
(1983). See generally, WASH. REV. CODE § 40.14.100 (2000).
147. As a former legislator, I would argue that the pertinent standing legislative committees
and their staffs have an affirmative obligation to monitor new judicial decisions on issues within
their committee jurisdiction and to take steps to enact legislation at the next legislative session to
correct judicial errors of interpretation.
148. See, e.g., Soproni v. Polygon Apartment Partners, 137 Wash. 2d 319, 327 n.3, 971
P.2d 500, 505 n.3 (1999); see also, e.g., McKinney v. State, 134 Wash. 2d 388, 403, 950 P.2d
461, 469 (1998); Manor v. Nestle Food Co., 131 Wash. 2d 439, 446 n.2, 932 P.2d 628, 631 n.2
(1997); State v. Coe, 109 Wash. 2d 832, 846, 750 P.2d 208, 215-16 (1988); Hangman Ridge
Training Stables, Inc. v. Safeco Title Ins. Co., 105 Wash. 2d 778, 789, 719 P.2d 531, 537 (1986).
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if ambiguous-is highly artificial. No real rigorous principles guide
the differentiation of plain from ambiguous statutes.
The better approach to judicial interpretation of statutes is to adhere to a standard previously expressed in Washington case law and
elsewhere. The courts should simply deduce the legislature's collective intent from what the legislature said in the text of the statute, using any other official expressions of intent the legislature sets forth in
the bill itself or in section 1.12 of the Washington Revised Code generally for all statutes.
To a degree, this approach to statutory interpretation means the
courts should undertake to construe a statute, regardless of whether
the courts believe the statute is plain or ambiguous. Instead, the
courts should endeavor to ascertain the legislature's intent from the
statutory language or any other official interpretive guides sanctioned
by the legislature itself. The courts may employ the traditional judicial canons of statutory interpretation in such an analysis, but the
courts should articulate which canons have primacy in the interpretation of statutes.
Finally, the judiciary may wish to consider a new doctrine of abstention in statutory construction. If a court's interpretation of a statute requires it to adopt one of two or more legitimate and competing
policy viewpoints, the better course for the court may be to abstain
from deciding the case and allow the legislature to resolve the controversy. For example, in National Electronical ContractorsAss'n v. Riveland,149 various contractors and unions challenged the use of inmate
labor on prison facilities when such inmate laborers were not licensed
electricians and the Department of Corrections did not specifically
comply with workplace safety laws. In response, the legislature not
only enacted section 19.28 of the Washington Revised Code pertaining to licensure of electricians and section 42.17 relating to workplace
safety, but also enacted section 72.10.110, encouraging use of inmate
labor on correctional facilities, and section 72.09.100, which directed
the Department of Corrections to operate a comprehensive inmate
work program and to "remove statutory and other restrictions which
The majority of the
have limited work programs in the past."' '
Washington State Supreme Court held that the licensure and workplace safety laws applied. The dissent disagreed, asserting the case
was not justiciable in light of the diametrically competing policies; the

149. 138 Wash. 2d 9, 978 P.2d 481 (1999).
150. WASH. REV. CODE § 72.09.100 (2000).
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dissent contended that the legislature should properly resolve such issues.151
IV. CONCLUSION

Washington courts have uncritically employed an artificial paradigm for statutory construction. Despite ferment in the federal courts
and scholarly journals on the proper role of the judiciary in interpreting statutes, Washington courts have not assessed whether its existing
paradigm adequately implements legislative intent, the theoretical
touchstone for the courts. Moreover, the courts' application of the
paradigm is inconsistent and episodic. Hence, it is difficult to determine what rules actually apply at what time.
Moreover, the legislature, despite grumbling about courts' misconstruction of its enactments, has done little to give courts guidance
with respect to the interpretation of particular enactments or statutes
generally.
Both the legislative and judicial branches of government need to
critically assess issues relating to statutory construction, each within
its respective sphere. Each branch can do far more to improve its
treatment of laws enacted by the first branch of our government.

151.
[W]e have legitimate and diametrically conflicting legislative policies before us. The
majority's determination to apply chapter 19.28 RCW and WISHA to inmates working on Department facilities potentially hobbles use of prison inmates' labor on correctional facilities projects, despite the strong legislative policy in favor of inmate labor's being used in the construction and repair of prison facilities. At the same time,
to apply the provisions of RCW 72.09.100, which speaks only in broad terms of removing unspecified statutory and other restrictions on inmate labor, to negate the icensure requirements for employees, seems far too broad an invitation to the courts
selectively to apply the statutory mandates otherwise designed to protect the public
and workers. In the absence of a clear policy choice from the Legislature and the
Governor, the parties have asked us to resolve this public policy conflict.
Resolution of the matter is within the easy purview of the Governor and the Legislature. Those are the branches of government constitutionally empowered and best
able to broker the various interests at play in this case. For the Court to allow itself to
be drawn into what is in essence a sociopolitical dispute is to misperceive our role in
our tripartite form of government.
Nat'l Elec. ContractorsAss'n, 138 Wash. 2d at 41-42, 978 P.2d at 497 (Talmadge, J., dissenting).

